Towards a New Social Contract in a Debt-Ridden Southern Economy? The City of Athens Perspective

While the question of whether cities can change the world feeds passionate debates and initiatives around the world, the challenge for Greece’s capital city is rather less ambitious. How can Athens cope with the social impact of the economic crisis in a sustainable way? Indeed, this is a crucial question when one bears in mind the severity of the crisis, on the one hand, and, on the other, the metropolitan size of Athens, which gathers approximately 660,000 registered residents. The fact is that Athens, Greece’s administrative and economic center, has symmetrically suffered from the socioeconomic decline. All these happen in a country where, admittedly, family solidarity can smoothen the crisis’ social impact in rural areas, but not so much in big urban centers, like Athens.

Crisis Politics in Europe: Vulnerability to Adjustment, Policy Responses and Political Conflict

The Euro crisis has turned into one of the most serious challenges that the European Union (EU) has had to face so far. At its root the crisis is a balance-of-payments crisis; caused by divergent economic developments among member states in the pre-crisis years and the deep financial integration that accompanied this process.

Who Controls the IMF?

The International Monetary Fund (IMF, or Fund) is governed by its member countries. Its daily business is conducted by a 24-member Executive Board, its directors representing countries, or groups of countries. Importantly, at the IMF, not all countries are the same – instead, so-called weighted voting governs the Fund. The “weight” of a country is determined by its economic importance, depending on variables like GDP, trade, and reserves of foreign currency. The resulting vote share of the United States, the single largest shareholder of the Fund, exceeds 17 percent. Japan and Germany follow, with around 6 percent each, then the United Kingdom and France with each around 5 percent of the voting weight. Most decisions at the Fund have to be taken with a majority of more than 50 percent (though formal votes are rarely taken), giving these few countries a substantial say in decision-making at the Fund.

Economic Consequences from the Enforcement of Deflationary Policies in Greece and the Case of Greek Shipping

"La democracie c' est s’addresser a l’intelligence des citoyens plutot que d’exciter leur peurs."

Francois Hollande, October 2015

The underlying intention of this presentation has been to provide an answer to the apparent inconsistency between the declared objective of assisting the Greek economy go back to economic development and the means presently employed to achieve this. The ailing Greek economy has been obliged to undergo a severe austerity programme over a lengthy period at a time of world recession as a precondition for receiving economic facilitation to stay in the Eurozone and return to economic development.

A Greek Bank Tragedy

The recent attempt to cover the needs of Greek banks in fresh capital via a mix of a private and public infusion of funds amounts to nothing else than a fire sale. The recent rights issues of Greek banks were fully covered because Greek bank shares were sold for a few pennies with offer prices ranging from 0.02 to 0.04 cent per share. At the same time, the Greek taxpayers’ stake in Greek banks, held via the so-called financial stability fund, is sharply diluted, e.g. in Alpha Bank the state’s stake is reduced to 11% from 66,4% today, in the Eurobank from 35% to 2,4%, in Piraeus Bank, which sold its new shares for 0.03 cent per share, from 67% today to 22%, although the bank will still receive 2.6bn Euros state aid, 2bn in the form of CoCos purchased exclusively by the Greek state, and 0.6bn in shares. Then, for the greatest Greek bank, the National Bank of Greece that didn’t manage to cover even 1/3 of the total amount sought while its shares were offered at 0.03 pence per share, the reduction of the Greek state’s stake will be 24% to 33% from 57% today. This while the state will still inject 2.75bn Euros in fresh funds, 2.06bn of this in CoCos and the rest in shares. At the same time, the state waives its rights on 1.45bn Euros preference shares, which will now be converted to common shares. In addition, the National Bank will have to sell its most valuable asset, its Turkish subsidiary at 2bn Euros while its acquisition in 2006 cost the Greek bank 5bn EUR.

Ισοι μεν, χωριστά δε

Είχαμε νωρίς υποστηρίξει («ΤΑ ΝΕΑ», 17/12/13) ότι συμμόρφωση με την καταδικαστική για την Ελλάδα απόφαση «Βαλλιανάτου και λοιπών» του Ευρωπαϊκού Δικαστηρίου Δικαιωμάτων του Ανθρώπου ήταν δυνατή είτε με την - προτιμητέα, για λόγους νομικούς και αξιακούς - επέκταση του συμφώνου συμβίωσης στα ομόφυλα ζευγάρια είτε με πλήρη κατάργησή του. Αυτό διότι η απόφαση «Βαλλιανάτου...» περιοριζόταν σε διάγνωση αρνητικής (κατά τη σχετική ορολογία) παραβίασης, λόγω παράνομης διάκρισης εις βάρος κοινωνικής ομάδας αποκλειόμενης από δικαίωμα που άλλη ομάδα απολαμβάνει. Με την πρόσφατη απόφαση «Ολιάρι και λοιποί κατά Ιταλίας», το Δικαστήριο επανήλθε στο ζήτημα ίσης μεταχείρισης των ομόφυλων ζευγαριών, προχωρώντας ένα βήμα πιο πέρα. Υπάρχει, πλέον, θετική υποχρέωση των κρατών να αναγνωρίζουν με ειδικό νομοθετικό πλαίσιο την ένωση ομοφύλων. Η απόφαση «Ολιάρι...» περιορίζει τη διακριτική ευχέρεια των κρατών. Η ιδιαιτέρως καλοδεχούμενη αυτή εξέλιξη συνεπάγεται ότι, πλέον, είναι μονόδρομος για την ελληνική Πολιτεία - εφόσον δεν κατοχυρώνει τα ομόφυλα ζευγάρια με γάμο, οπότε και θα μπορούσε να καταργήσει το σύμφωνο συμβίωσης - η επέκταση του συμφώνου στα ομόφυλα ζευγάρια.

Who is to Blame for Austerity and its Consequences in Greece?

By the end of the crisis, Greece will have lost about 27-30% of its economic output. This sort of disaster is usually seen only after wars and biblical events –but who is to blame in this case since God and the generals had presumably nothing to do with it? A popular cause is “austerity forced upon Greece by international institutions”. This is doubly flawed.