The edifice
of the European Union (EU) has been built on the basis of equilibrium between intergovernmental
co-operation and supranationalism. In other words, the fathers of Europe wanted
to attain integration through the institution of organs which would be
representative of the two currents: institutions with an intergovernmental
character, through which the voice of the Member-States could be heard, and
institutions with a supranational character, which would represent Europe, as a
potentially integrated entity, with its own interests and expectations. In the
first category, the central institution is the Council of Ministers, which
functions with the presence of national Ministers, depending on the
subject-matter of the agenda, while in the second category the main organs are
the Commission and the European Parliament. The Courts, finally, settle
disputes in a spirit of supranationalism, and in this direction they have
offered their good offices to integration.
This initial
equilibrium has been disturbed lately. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty
introduced a new form, beyond the Council of Ministers, which reinforces the
intergovernmental character of the EU, and replaces to a certain degree the
entirety of the institutions. The triptych European Council - President of the
European Council - High Commissioner (for Foreign Affairs) intervenes in the
works of the Council of Ministers, and the works of the Commission. Indeed the
European Council, which is constituted of heads of States or governments,
determines the basic orientations of the EU, and, as a consequence,
intervenes in the works of the Council of Ministers, which is an institution
made up by subordinates of the heads of State or governments, as well as in the
works of the Commission, which is tyrannized by this fact. Certainly, through its provisions, the
Treaty of Lisbon takes care of the equilibrium among
the competences of the various institutions -both new and traditional- on the basis
of multilateral co-operation and good faith. Exception to that is the Common
Foreign and Security Policy, which, in any event, was, at all times, in the
hands of the intergovernmental institution, dragging down the overall multi-head
foreign policy of the EU.
However,
apart from the institutional barrier to supranationalism (given that the
intergovernmental institutions have shown, by using their conventional power,
serious examples of introversion and national egoisms), the very central
supranational institution, that is, the Commission, has many times discredited itself,
having been transformed to an executive organ of the European Council. This
phenomenon may be the result of the absence of strong personalities in the
Commission, who axiomatically would impose the equilibrium, on the basis of
their conventional competence.
The question
is what was the reason for such a transformation of the EU? During the seventies
and the eighties, the EU was an Organization that was giving promises of
integrating Europe, and that was followed by many Europeans who believed
in its work and achievements. What happened and changed this pattern,
transforming this Organization into a most routine-like, indifferent entity? I
think that one of the main reasons for this was the massive accession of a
great number of States to its membership. Indeed, the EU, in a period of some
years, has been enriched by 13 new States, most of them coming from Eastern
Europe and the former socialist countries. These States acceded to EU unprepared
to cope with the exigencies of the Organization, and totally inimical to
integration. The reasons of their accession were to secure their borders from
Russia, and to develop gradually an economic and social system resembling the
Western system. Some of them have declared their opposition to integration,
expressing serious concerns about that. They enjoyed their independence and
sovereignty for the first time, after so many years of subjugation to the USSR,
and they were not willing -as one leader of a country said- to fall in the
hands of Brussels.
This phenomenon has
had its repercussions upon other European countries: some States, the
traditional Eurosceptic ones, found in them an ally in their battle
against integration. Some others, namely those believing in integration, were
discouraged and disappointed by the attitudes of the newcomers. In a rather
short period of time, the transformation of the EU was accomplished: the
institutions that had the real powers in their hands became those which were
intergovernmental, to the detriment of supranationalism. Gradually, the
States who had the economic power imposed themselves upon the others. This
transformation did not go unnoticed. Soon, the people of the countries who were
members of the Union were also disappointed and discouraged. The percentage of satisfaction
vis-à-vis the Union has fallen to a record low, from a record high in
previous years. In some countries it has fallen to 30%, or even lower.
What should
be done to give back this lost confidence to the people of the Union in its
future? I think that the only solution would be the return of the Union to the
period of supranationalism, when the Organization flourished. In this respect,
the easiest way out of the inertia of the present is the completion of the Economic
and Monetary Union, by the introduction of the economic union into the agenda.
A first step has already been made through the Banking Union, a measure which,
despite its deficiencies, is a progress. This owes to the current crisis,
and the conclusions drawn from that. Real economic union cannot be achieved
without the creation of a central authority supervising the States’ budgets,
and the replacement of the national
authorities with international ones. In any event, I strongly believe that the
EMU is the policy from which we can start the integration, not only because its
members seem to be willing to proceed accordingly, but also because its completion
is a prerequisite for the full development of this policy.
Furthermore,
I believe that in order for the Union to come back to the orbit of integration,
the institutions which are responsible for this integration should be
reinforced. To that end, the monopoly of legislative initiative, which is in
the hands of the Commission, must be shared with the European Parliament. What
happens at present is that the Parliament is asking the Commission to submit
suitable proposals to various subjects. What should happen instead is that the
monopoly of legislative initiative, which is now in the hands of the Commission, be
shared with the European Parliament. This measure would strengthen the
democratic legitimation in the Union, and the prevalence of the rule of law.
And, it goes without saying, that the Commission must be strengthened with
personalities able to resist the initiatives of the European Council. In the long history of European institutions,
the bras de fer between intergovernmental and supranational organs is not
unusual, and, at the end, each time the victorious power is the one who is able
to resist the challenges of the other.
In any event,
the election of the new President of the Commission gives us hope that, this
time, integration will progress, and
that the intergovernmental pattern that tantalized the EU for so many years is now behind us in the years to come.
Christos
Rozakis, Professor (emeritus) of Public International Law, University of Athens; President,
Administrative Tribunal of the Council of Europe; Former First Vice-President of
the European Court of Human Rights
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